B    M    07ft    '^ftO 


FINANCES  AND  COSTS  OF  THE  PRESENT 
EUROPEAN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9287-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


512 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


^-/^'/(  '"'■■"  "•■•//" 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  512. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


0 


SYNOPSIS. 


Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Policy  employed  in  financing  the  war 5 

(«)  Great  Britain 5 

(b)  France 5 

(c)  Russia 6 

(d)  Italy 6 

(e)  Belgium 6 

(/)  Serbia 6 

(g)  Japan 6 

(h)  Germany 6 

(i)  Austria-Hungary 8 

(k)  Turkey 8 

2.  Cost  of  the  war  (Tables  1  an(^) 9-10 

(a)  Great  Britain 9 

(b)  France 9 

(c)  Russia 9 

(d)  Italy . .  9 

(e)  Belgium 9 

(/)  Serbia 9 

(g)  Japan 9 

(h)  Germany 10 

(i)  Austria-Hungaiy 10 

(h)  Turkey 10 

3.  Number  and  amount  of  domestic  loans  (Table  3) 10-11 

(a)  Great  Britain 10 

(b)  France 10 

(c)  Russia 10 

(d)  Italy 10 

(e)  Belgium 10 

(/)  Serbia 10 

(g)  Japan 10 

(h)  Germany 11 

(i)  Austria-Hungarj^ 11 

(k)  Turkey 11 

4.  Number  and  amount  of  foreign  loans  (Table  4) 11 

(«)  Great  Britain 11 

(b)  France 11 

(c)  Russia 11 

(d)  Italy 11 

(e)  Belgium 11 

(/)  Serbia 11 

(g)  Japan 11 

(h)  Germany 11 

(i)  Austria-Hungary 11 

(Jt)  Turkey 11 

5.  Total  and  per  capita  national  -wealth ;  national  debts 11 

Table  5 11 

30669°— No.  512 Ifi  (3) 


FINANCES  AND  COSTS  OF  THE  PRESENT  EUROPEAN 

WAR. 


INTRODUCTION. 

A  careful  search  of  the  files  of  the  War  College  has  been  made 
for  data  covering  the  various  points  of  the  study.  The  results  are 
embodied  in  the  following  pages.  As  was  to  have  been  expected, 
accurate  data  are  almost  wholly  lacking,  and  such  as  have  been 
secured  are  of  doubtful  accuracy.  The  various  w^arring  nations  are 
naturally  not  publishing  information  on  this  subject  at  this  time, 
and  the  majority  of  the  figures  quoted  in  the  following  pages  are 
little  better  than  estimates. 

1.  POLICY  EMPLOYED  IN  FINANCING  THE  WAR. 

(a)  Great  Britain. — Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  Great 
Britain  had  made  no  plans  for  putting  the  country  upon  a  sound 
financial  basis  for  war.  The  Imperial  Government  was  as  unpre- 
pared to  meet  the  financial  emergency  caused  by  the  war  as  it  was 
to  oppose  the  trained  armies  of  central  Europe  with  an  adequate 
number  of  properly  trained  and  equipped  troops.  Since  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  England  ha<s  endeavored  to  meet  the  situation  by 
laying  heavy  taxes  on  imports,  "  war  profits,"  incomes,  spirits,  tea, 
etc.,  and  in  some  cases  the  taxes  on  incomes  have  amounted  to  33  per 
cent.  The  increased  income  derived  from  these  sources  has,  of  course, 
proven  utterly  inadequate  to  provide  the  huge  sums  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Government  and  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 
Great  Britain  has  therefore  been  obliged  to  borrow  extensively,  and 
according  to  the  best  available  information  the  amount  she  has  ob- 
tained in  this  way  at  home  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  is  approxi- 
mately $5,489,000,000.  Her  foreign  war  loans  aggregate  approxi- 
mately $250,000,000. 

England  has  joined  Avith  France  and  Russia  in  providing  a  fund 
of  $200,000,000  for  meeting  in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium. 
Japan,  and  Serbia,  and  in  addition  it  is  believed  has  loaned  Belgium 
$50,000,000  and  Serbia  $4,000,000  without  interest  until  the  end  of 
the  war. 

(h)  France. — The  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  August,  1914.  found 
France  well  prepared  financially  to  enter  the  war.     For  some  years 

512 

(5) 


prior  thereto  France,  like  Germany  and  Russia,  had  been  building 
up  a  war  reserve  which,  when  war  came,  enabled  her  to  put  her  well- 
trained  and  equipped  armies  into  the  field  with  the  assurance  that 
for  a  time  at  least  there  was  no  fear  of  a  lack  of  funds  for  the  prose- 
cution of  the  war.  However,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  France, 
like  all  other  nations  involved  in  the  war,  must  resort  to  borrowing 
to  meet  the  enormous  expenses  of  the  situation.  Since  the  war  began 
France  has  borrowed  at  home  approximately  $1,680,000,000.  A  por- 
tion of  this  sum  was  obtained  directly  from  the  French  people,  who 
subscribed  liberally  to  what  was  known  as  National-Defense  Bonds, 
which  ran  for  from  6  to  12  months  and  bore  interest  at  5  per  cent. 
A  later  domestic  loan  which  made  up  the  total  sum  borrowed  at 
home  was  floated  through  the  Bank  of  France  in  the  form  of  bonds 
for  a  term  of  years  and  bearing  interest  at  5  per  cent.  Later,  in 
order  to  secure  gold  for  purchases  abroad,  the  Government  called 
upon  the  people  to  exchange  bullion  for  paper  currency  and  even  to 
turn  into  the  treasury  gold  ornaments,  jewelry,  etc.  The  response 
to  these  requests  was  most  patriotic. 

France  has  also  joined  with  England  in  negotiating  in  the  United 
States  a  loan  of  $500,000,000  at  5  per  cent,  and  has  contributed  to  a 
fund  of  $200,000,000  to  meet  in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium, 
Japan,  and  Serbia.  Her  other  foreign-  loans  aggregate  $148,000,000, 
and  are  shown  in  more  detail  under  (b)  Table  4. 

(c)  Russia. — Russia  had  accumulated  a  large  war  reserve  at  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities.  Part  of  this  reserve  which  was  on  deposit  in 
Berlin  was  withdrawn  during  the  week  preceding  the  war.  The  in- 
creased expenses  due  to  the  war  are  being  met  by  increasing  the 
rates  of  taxes  already  in  force  and  by  borrowing.  So  far  as  known, 
Russia  since  the  beginning  of  the  w^ar  has  made  three  domestic 
loans  aggregating  about  $1,339,000,000.  She  has  also  joined  with 
England  and  France  in  providing  a  fund  of  $200,000,000  to  meet 
in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium,  Japan,  and  Serbia. 

(d)  Italy. — No  data  are  available  respecting  the  financial  policy 
of  Italy  or  the  measures  so  far  adopted  to  meet  war  conditions. 
She  has  borrowed  about  $425,000,000. 

(e)  BelgkiTn. — Nothing  is  known  of  the  policy  of  Belgium  with 
respect  to  financing  the  war  except  that  she  has  been  aided  by  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  as  already  stated.  She  has,  however, 
been  aided  by  Great  Britain  by  a  loan  of  $50,000,000  without  interest. 

(/)  Serhia. — Same  as  for  Belgium.  Great  Britain  has  loaned 
Serbia  $4,000,000  without  interest. 

{g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

{h)  Germany. — The  following  abstract  of  a  description  of  the 
German  method  of  financing  the  present  war,  by  Roland  G.  Usher, 
512 


in  the  December,  1914,  issue  of  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  is  given  as 
the  best  and  clearest  exposition  of  the  subject  yet  available : 

Great  sums  of  ready  money  have  invariably  been  needed  in  Anglo-Saxon 
countries  in  order  to  begin  a  war,  because  those  countries  have  invariably 
been  caught  unprepared.  The  Government  has  lacked  not  only  the  necessary 
materials,  but  the  knowledge  of  their  whereabouts,  and  has  had  to  find  them 
by  ordinary  business  methods,  which  meant  buying  them  in  open  market 
with  money.  England  and  the  United  States  have  always  obtained  in  the 
same  way  the  supplies  and  munitions  needed  to  prosecute  war  and  have  always 
found  an  abundant  supply  of  stable  currency  the  indispensable  nexus  between 
the  Government   and   its  citizens  by   whom   the  commodities   were  produced. 

German  statesmen  and  financiers  have,  however,  arrived  at  an 
entirely  different  solution  of  the  question.  The  German  system  of 
"  financing  "  war  depends  upon  the  following : 

The  army  requires  matermi  for  its  use  and  maintenance  as  does  the 
nation  at  large,  and  stei>s  were  taken  in  time  of  peace  to  insure  the 
supply  of  this  material  upon  the  outbreak  and  continuance  of  war. 

Certain  supplies  Germany  did  not  and  could  not  produce  and 
those  supplies  were  purchased  and  stored  in  quantity  before  the 
outbreak  of  war.  The  vast  supplies  necessary  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  and  before  their  manufacture  could  be  increased  were  also 
purchased  and  stored. 

Certain  other  supplies  Germany  did  not  produce  in  normal  times 
or  did  not  produce  them  in  the  quantity  sufficient  for  prosecuting 
Avar.  These  supplies  could  be  produced,  however,  if  adequate  prepa- 
ration were  made  therefor  in  advance. 

Supplies  of  both  the  above  classes  would  be  necessary  not  only 
for  the  use  of  the  army,  but  for  the  nation  at  large  as  well. 

In  order  to  gather  the  class  of  supplies  which  she  could  not  pro- 
duce at  any  time,  capital  was  necessary  with  which  to  purchase 
them.  Capital  was  also  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  subsidizing 
manufactures  for  the  supply  of  materials  which  would  be  needed 
in  increased  quantities  in  time  of  war  and  which  required  special 
machinery  and  skilled  labor  for  their  production.  To  secure  this 
capital  Germany  imposed  before  the  outbreak  of  war  a  "  war  levy,'' 
which  was  a  direct  tax,  amounting  to  $250,000,000,  Avhich,  they  ex- 
plained, was  necessary  to  render  the  army  efficient.  With  the  capital 
thus  obtained  she  "purchased  in  Germanv  and  abroad  every  con- 
ceivable sort  of  supplies  necessary  to  put  the  nation  in  position  nec- 
essary to  make  war." 

As  Germany  employs  the  system  of  universal  military  service,  she 
can  tell  just  what  men  will  be  called  away  from  their  usual  pursuits 
upon  the  outbreak  of  war.  She  knew  in  advance,  therefore,  just 
what  men  would  have  to  be  replaced  by  individuals  not  to  be  called 
to  the  colors  in  order  to  provide  for  the  supply  of  commodities  neces- 

512 


8 

sary  during  war.  She  therefore  subsidized  manufactures  in  order 
to  enable  them  to  place  in  the  factories  the  machinery  which  would 
be  required  during  war  and  to  train  enough  additional  labor  for 
operating  the  machinery — the  additional  laborers  to  consist  of  indi- 
viduals who  were  not  to  be  called  to  the  colors. 

In  this  manner  Germany  prepared  in  peace  for  the  supplies  she 
Avould  need  in  war. 

Money  in  time  of  war,  as  at  any  other  time,  tlie  Germans  concluded,  meant 
currency,  and  currency  meant  some  medium  of  excliange  which  would  be 
accepted-  by  the  people  at  face  value.  So  long  as  the  public  confidence  in  the 
Government  was  unshaken  and  ultimate  success  was  believed  certain,  a  paper 
currency  would  serve  the  purpose  much  better  than  specie.  The  banking  sys- 
tem, to  be  sure,  collected  gold  as  assiduously  as  it  could  during  the  months 
preceding  the  war  and  is  supposed  to  have  vastly  increased  the  German  gold 
reserve,  which  was  to  give  stability  to  the  paper  currency  and  furnish  a  firm 
basis  for  such  international  exchange  as  they  might  eventually  find  necessary. 
The  central  banking  system,  however,  *  *  *  could  absolutely  control  all 
exchange,  could  accept  as  collatei*al  for  loans  whatever  the  individual  had  to 
offer  and  issue  him  paper  credits.  There  would  be  plenty  of  real  value  because 
there  would  be  plenty  of  real  work ;  the  Government  would  see  to  that. 

The  banks  would  make  loans  to  the  manufacturer  and  establish  a  checking 
account  on  which  they  would  pay  him  paper,  which  in  time  he  would  pay  his 
employees,  who  would  pay  it  out  for  commodities.  The  dealers  would  pay  it 
back  into  the  banks,  when  the  whole  transaction  would,  as  usual,  be  canceled. 

In  this  way  Germany  is  attempting  to  avoid  the  necessity  for 
borrowing  the  vast  sums  from  neutral  countries  which  the  other 
w^arring  nations  are  apparently  going  to  have  to  do. 

The  bond  issues  which  she  has  made  are  not  concerned  wdth  the 
war  itself  so  much  as  with  the  necessary  readjustments  after  the 
war  is  over. 

As  observers  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  pass  upon  the  ultimate  validity 
of  these  measures.  We  can  only  point  out  that  they  seem  to  conform  accu- 
rately to  the  experience  of  history  and  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  literal 
application  of  the  simple  postulates  of  political  economy.  So  far  as  we  can 
tell,  if  private  letters  ai"e  any  evidence  of  what  conditions  in  Germany  at  pres- 
ent are,  every  indication  points  toward  the  overwhelming  success  of  German 
finance. 

(^)  Austria-Hungary. — No  data  are  available  concerning  the  plans 
of  the  Government  of  Austria-Hungary  for  financing  the  war.  It 
is  known  that  she  has  borrowed  money  and  that  her  first  loan  w^as 
made  quietly  through  the  banks,  but  the  amount  so  obtained  and  the 
rate  of  interest  paid  are  not  definitely  known.  Her  total  domestic 
loans  amount  to  $1,181,000,000.  No  further  data  concerning  the 
financial  transactions  of  Austria-Hungary  are  available. 

{k)  Turkey. — It  is  reported  that  Turkey  has  received  material 
financial  aid  from  Germany  in  the  form  of  a  loan  of  $250,000,000. 
No  other  data  concerning  the  financial  policy  and  transactions  of 
Turkey  are  available. 

512 


2.  COST  OF  THE  WAR. 

In  so  far  us  this  can  be  ascertained,  it  is  shown  by  Tables  1  and  2 
appended,  Table  1  giving  what  is  known  of  the  total  cost  to  date 
and  Table  2  the  daily  cost  at  the  periods  stated.  These  figures  are 
only  estimates,  of  course,  and,  as  it  is  generally  conceded  that  the 
war  is  becoming  increasingly  costly,  are  probably  far  below  the 
actual  amounts  at  this  time. 

3.  NUMBER  AND  AMOUNT  OF  DOMESTIC  LOANS. 

The  number  and  amount  of  domestic  loans,  in  so  far  as  they  can 
be  ascertained,  are  shown  in  Table  3.  It  must  be  understood  that 
the  information  on  this  subject  comes  from  various  newspapers  and 
that  its  accuracy  can  not  be  vouched  for. 

4.  NUMBER  AND  AMOUNT  OF  FOREIGN  LOANS. 

This  information  is  contained  in  Table  4.  "With  the  exception  of 
the  Anglo-French  loan  made  in  the  United  States,  the  same  remarks 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  information  applies  here  as  in  the  case  of 
domestic  loans. 

5.  A  TABLE  SHOWING  TOTAL  AND  PER  CAPITA  NATIONAL  WEALTH 
OF  VARIOUS  NATIONS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR;  ALSO 
NATIONAL  DEBTS  IN  1914  AND  ESTIMATED  AMOUNTS  IN  1916. 

Table  1. — Cost  of  the  war. 

(«)  Great  Britain.— '^S, 525 ,000,000  for  one  year  only.  (Collier's 
Weekly,  Nov.  6-15,  p.  11.) 

Note. — To  this  amount  slionld  be  added  some  portion  of  $200,000,000  furnished 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  jointly  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

(5)  France.— $1,750,000,000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August 
1, 1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

Note. — To  this  amount  should  be  added  some  portion  of  $200,000,000  furnished 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

(c)  Russia.— $2,000^0.000  for  period  April  1,  1015,  to  August  1, 
1915.     (Re\iew  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

NoTK. — To  this  amount  should  be  added  some  portion  of  $200,000,000  furnished 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

(d)  Italy.— $S00,000.000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August  1, 
1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

(e)  Belgium. — No  data. 
(/)  Serhia. — No  data. 
{g)  Japan. — No  data. 


10 

(h)  Germany. — $2,500,000,000  (includes  Turkey's  expenditures) 
for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August  1,  1915.  (Keview  of  Reviews, 
April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

{i)  Aust7^'<i-Hungary.— $1,500,000,000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to 
August  1,  1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

(/i)   Turkey. — See  Germany. 

Table  2. — Daily  cost  of  the  toar. 

(a)  Great  Britain.— $U,100,000  (Collier's  Weekly,  Nov.  6,  1915, 
p.  11).    Present  time. 

(5)  /^ra^e.— $7,000,000  (Literary  Digest,  Dec.  5,  1914,  p.  1151). 
During  August,  September,  and  October,  1914. 

(c)  Russia. — No  data. 

(d)  Italy. — No  data. 

(e)  Belgium. — No  data. 
(/)  Serhia. — No  data. 
{g)  Ja,pan. — No  data. 

{h)   Germany.— %5, 000, 000  to  $7,000,000  (Literary  Digest,  Dec.  5, 
1914,  p.  1152).    Prior  to  December,  1914. 
{i)  Austria-Hungary. — No  data. 
ih)   Turkey. — No  data. 

Table  3. — Domestic  loans. 

[Except  when  otherwise  noted,  the  figures  for  this  table  were  taken  from  the  Literary 
Digest,  Nov.  20,  1915,  p.  1J.98,  quoting  New  York  Times  Annalist.] 

(«)   Great  Britain. — 

Bonds  3*  per  cent  (10  to  13  years  sold  at  95) $1,  750,  000,  000 

Bonds  Al  per  cent 2,  925,  000,  000 

Five-year  exchequer  3s 239,  000,000 

Treasury  bills    (21   per  cent  to  3|    per  cent),   six   months 

(estimated  as  now  outstanding) , 575,  000,  000 

Note. — Wlien  the  41  per  cent  loan  was  made  the  rate  of  interest  on  all  preceding  loans 
was  voluntarily  raised  to  4J  per  cent,  with  the  promise  that  if  further  loans  at  higher 
rates  of  interest  became  necessary  all  prior  loans  should  bear  such  higher  rates. 

{h)  France. — 

Bonds,  national  defense,  5  per  cent  (6  to  12  months) $1,  230,  000,  000 

Bonds,  Treasury,  5  per  cent  (a  term  of  years) 450,000,000 

(<?)  Russia. — 

Bonds  5  per  cent '- $515,  000,  000 

Bonds  5*  per  cent 515,  000,  000 

Bonds  4  per  cent 309,  000,  000 

Treasury  bills  at  home  and  in  England  and  France 1,  252,  000,  000 

{d)  Italy. — 

Bonds  5i  per  cent $200,000,000 

Bonds  4i  per  cent 200,  000,  000 

(e)   Belgium. — No  data  available. 
(/)  Serbia. — No  data  available. 
{g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

512 


11 

{h)   Germany. — 

First  war  loan  5s $1,  115,000.  000 

Second  war  loan  5"s 2,265,000,000 

Third  war  loan  5's 8,025,000,000 

{i)   Austria- Hungary. — 

Austrian  bonds  54  per  cent .$433,  000,  000 

Hungarian  bonds  6  per  cent 237,000,000 

War  loans,  credits,  etc 1,161,000,000 

{k)   Twkey. — No  data  available. 

Table  4. — Foreign  loans. 

[Except  when  otherwise  noted,  the  figures  for  this  table  were  taken   from  the   Literary 
Digest,  Nov.  20,  1915,  p.  1198,  quoting  New  York  Times  Annalist.] 

{a)   Great  Britain. — 

One-half  of  Anglo-French  credit  in   New   York   5   per   cent 

bonds .$250,  000,  000 

(b)  France. — 

One-year  5  per  cent  notes  in  London .$50,  000,  000 

One-year  5  per  cent  notes  in  New  York 25,000,  000 

Credits  and  collateral  loan  in  New  York 73,  000,  000 

One-half  Anglo-French  loan  in  New  York 250,000,000 

((?)  Russia. — See  "Treasury  bills,"'  etc.,  under  (c)  Russia,  table  3. 

{d)   Italy. — Loan  now  being  placed  in  New  York,  $25,000,000. 

{e)  Belgiunfi. — $50,000,000  loaned  by  British  Government  during 
the  war  without  interest. 

(/)  Serbia. — $4,000,000  loaned  by  British  Government  during  the 
war  without  interest. 

(g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

(h)   Germany. — 

Notes  in  United  States .$10,000,000 

(^)  Atostria-Hungiary. — No  data  available. 
(k)   Turkey. — 

Loan  in  Germany $250,000,000 

Table  5. 


National 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


Per  capita 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


(o)  Oreat  Britain.  $85,000,000,000 


(6)  France. 

(e)  Russia. .. 
(rf)  Italy.... 

(f)  Belgium. 
(/)  Serbia... 


50, 000, 000, 000 
40, 000, 000, 000 
20, 000, 000, 000 
9,000,000,000 
500,000,000 


(?) 
(?) 


$1, 777 

1,625 

250 

588 


National 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


Per  capita 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


((?)  Japan ' 

Qi)  Germany 

(i)  Austria- ilim- 

gary 

(fc)  Turkey 


$80, 000, 000, 000 

25,000,000,000 
3,000,000,000 


(?) 


?92:} 
,500 


NATIONAL  DEBT. 


ia)  Great  Britain. 
{b)  France 

(c)  Russia 

(d)  Italy  

(f)  Belgium 

(/)  Serbia 


512 


1914 


1916 


$3,485,000,000 
6,345,000,000 
4, 540, 000, 000 
2, 850, 000, 000 
825, 000, 000 
125,000,000 


$11,000,000,000 

9, 500, 000, 000 

6,500,000,000 

3,000,000,000 

825, 000, 000 

125,000,000 


(o)  Japan  > 

(A)  Germany.....    $3,735,000,000 
(i)  Austria- Hun-  ; 

gary 1,050,000,000 

(t)  Turkey 675,000,000 


1916 


$9,985,000,000 

2,000,000,000 
675,000,000 


1  No  data  available. 


o 


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